Introduction
In 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan with more than 40,000 men. They quickly defeated the Afghan Army and installed a government more favorable to British interests. Over the following years, Afghan resistance grew, ultimately resulting in British withdrawal in 1881. 1 Years later, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, seized control of the central government, killed the president, and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. 2 Thereafter the Mujahadeen resistance grew, forcing Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Two decades later, a US-led coalition overthrew the Taliban and supported establishment of a government, led by Hamid Karzai, which was more favorable to western interests. Over the next eleven years the resistance has grown and now, in 2013, the conclusion of another conflict in Afghanistan is unclear.
As the Coalition enters its thirteenth year in Afghanistan there are questions about our objectives, approach, and chances for success. This paper argues that Afghan stability will only be achieved through a long-term approach using a single, small, civil-military command, supporting civilian-led efforts to improve governmental capacity, linking the central government to rural Afghans. A long-term approach is needed to replace the social elites who were lost in over three decades of conflict and to develop functional governmental institutions with manageable levels of corruption. Functional institutions are required to link the central government to rural Afghanistan, taking popular support from the insurgency. An enduring commitment will allow a coalition presence in the region, countering violent extremists operating from the loosely governed border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. A single headquarters is critical to ensure unity of effort amongst disparate coalition elements. Problems in Afghanistan are primarily political; consequently the military effort must be led by the civilian expertise necessary to focus on governmental advising. Finally, the military effort should remain relatively small. By doing so, it will have to focus on advising as opposed to partnering, forcing the Afghans to take responsibility for solving their own problems. As a result, Afghans will be more likely to develop solutions which are more acceptable to their people.
Importance of the coalition effort
A withdrawal before the Afghan government is capable of stabilizing the country would lead to a series of events, mirroring the period after Soviet withdrawal. The current government would attempt to maintain stability, but likely lose control in a few years. A weak central government, unable to maintain a hold on the country, would cede power to warlords asserting regional dominance. Ultimately, warlords would again start fighting one another, seeking extended influence. Ultimately, the Taliban, of similar organization, would seize power once again, supported by people opting for a repressive regime instead of lawlessness. Consequently, Afghans would lose many of their civil liberties. Female educational programs would suffer.
Sharia law would grip the country. Most importantly, the Taliban would likely, once again, provide safe-haven for terrorist groups. While the Taliban are regionally focused and not considered an international threat, their fundamentalist ideals and Sharia law parallel those of many Islamic terrorist groups. Finally, the topography in southern and eastern Afghanistan is extremely remote, providing countless hideouts. Terrorist safe-havens are dangerous in any area, but sanctuaries close to a nuclear-armed Pakistan is particularly troubling.
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Proponents of a counter-terrorist approach argue that safe-havens may be prevented using drones, missiles, and raids from outside the country. This strategy is flawed for two reasons.
With support by Afghans in remote regions, terrorists will literally have tens of thousands of places to hide. Second, with no forces on the ground it would be extremely challenging to develop the intelligence necessary to locate terrorists in hiding. 4 By contrast, the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan would permit both unilateral and combined Afghan-Coalition raids, developing valuable intelligence, and denying terrorists areas from which to train and launch world-wide operations. Furthermore, a counter-terrorist approach simply addresses symptoms of a larger problem which can only be rectified through governmental reform.
Another reason to stay the course in Afghanistan is to prevent a resurgence of Al Qaeda.
Afghanistan is a special place for the terrorist organization. Osama Bin Laden gained his initial popularity in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviets. Many fundamentalists believe that this
Jihad resulted in the Soviet Union's collapse. 5 Thereafter, Al Qaeda trained in Afghanistan preparing for the attacks of 9/11. The defeat of another world power in Afghanistan would be an enormous strategic victory for the terrorist group, permitting the popular support for resurgence.
In short, failure to continue the effort in Afghanistan will almost certainly lead to regional instability and proliferation of extremists capable of threatening the United States. The current situation in Afghanistan bears striking parallels to the condition near the end of the Soviet Union's deployment, signifying a predictable future. However, a small, relatively cheap, longterm effort in Afghanistan is worth the price when compared to the cost of the large scale deployments seen by the Soviet Union, and the current Coalition.
Situation
Afghan society is dominated by several nefarious elements inside and outside the central government. Each competes for, or at a minimum, disrupts the tenuous control the government has on the country. The first group is the warlords. These men wield substantial regional power This paranoia drives their regional engagement, and has soured their relations with the Karzai government. 12 For decades, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has used militants as proxy forces to exert influence in the Kashmir. More recently, the ISI has used the Taliban to foment the Afghan insurgency; intent on weakening the Karzai Government. 13 This foreign policy strategy has backfired with the development of the Pakistani Taliban, intent on overthrowing the government in Islamabad. 14 The military has proven somewhat effective in countering the Pakistani Taliban, but has an arrangement with other militants in the FATA; they will not oppose groups that do not attack Pakistan. 15 This leaves the tribal areas free for the Afghan Taliban and other groups to train and plan operations against ANSF and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
This double game will surely backfire as there are strong links between the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban. Since 2008, several efforts have been made by the Afghan, US, and German
Governments to open peace talks with the Afghan Taliban in an effort to arrive at a political arrangement amenable to all sides. The ISI has undermined these efforts, insisting they control the outcome in favor of Pakistan. 16 Most troubling is the fact that this failing state has the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world with over 100 nuclear weapons. 17 The mix of a failing state, ungoverned areas, Islamic extremism, and nuclear weapons is an extremely dangerous cocktail.
Between 2001 and 2010, the US gave a total of $20.5 billion in aid to Pakistan, of which $14.4 billion when to the military, $4.8 billion to buy down the debt, and only $1.3 billion was used for economic development. 18 Addressing instability in Pakistan is critical to success in Afghanistan.
The international community should take a hard line with Pakistan and tie continued financial aid to political reform and substantive efforts to combat extremist groups.
The Soviet intervention
In April 1978, a communist coup overthrew the nationalist regime led by Mohammad Daud.
A few months later a popular rebellion broke out, challenging the young communist regime. By late winter, the Soviets realized they needed to intervene to save the new communist government and protect Soviet national interests on their southern border. 19 The Soviet's war in Afghanistan started much like the current conflict. From 25 to 27 December 1979, the Soviet Army invaded, killed the president, and installed their own leader in his place. After a quick victory over the government, they worked to stabilize the country. They secured the major urban centers, garrisons, airfields, and roads. They left rural security to the Afghan Army. Their focus on securing the lines of communication, freed Afghan forces to fight the Mujahadeen. 20 However, this strategy proved ineffective, because the Afghan security forces were incapable of providing rural security. For most of the war, insurgents controlled over 75% of the country. 21 During this period, the Minister of Defense claimed the Army maintained numbers between 120,000 and 150,000 when, in fact, they only numbered around 40,000. 22 Reaching the goal of 200,000
Soldiers was difficult with over 30,000 desertions annually. By the time the Soviets withdrew, the security forces including army, police and secret police totaled just over 230,000, far less than the 700,000 required to achieve the 20 security personnel per 1000 inhabitants expected for a successful counter insurgency. 23 The Soviets did focus on training the Afghan Army, although they trained Soviet Doctrine which focused on large formations in a conventional struggle, offering little help in defeating an insurgency. 24 When it became evident that Afghan security forces were incapable of independent operations, the Soviets took a more prevalent role. In many cases, the Soviets did not trust the Afghans enough to share operational information with them; meanwhile the Afghans were satisfied with letting the Soviets lead operations. 25 In the end, Afghan security forces were too few, with little training in counter-insurgent operations.
Consequently, the central government was not connected with rural Afghans due to inadequate security.
From the 1950s to the early 90s the Soviet Union poured development opportunities into
Afghanistan. Over this period the Soviets initiated over 270 major projects including roads, power infrastructure, irrigation canals, factories, housing, airports, and much more. 26 Additionally, the Soviets provided funding to develop eight technical schools, which trained more than 100,000 Afghan workers. 27 Thousands more received more formal training in Soviet universities and technical schools based on a Soviet-Afghan educational agreement signed in 1980. 28 Despite the financial aid delivered by the Soviet Union, only half the projects were completed. Surprisingly, this failure is not due to a lack of capital investment or vocational skills but rather a result of poor governance. 29 The government simply lacked the capacity to administer development programs effectively. The inept institutions coupled with the rampant corruption prevented completion of nearly half the development projects. 30 This indicates the challenge is more political than economical or developmental.
Soviets worked diligently to improve governmental capacity sending more than 10,000
advisors to virtually every department of the central government. The advisors extended to provincial and even local governments where security allowed. Additionally, they provided educational opportunities for more than 6,000 Afghans in the Soviet Union. As the war progressed, the Soviet advisors exerted increasing power. By the mid-80s, Afghan politicians were unable to conduct even routine business without the expressed approval of their Soviet advisor. 31 In effect, the Afghan government was simply a figurehead, controlled by Moscow, having virtually no independence. Consequently, the government lacked legitimacy, and failed to develop the capacity required to govern effectively.
For seven years, from 1979 to 1986, Babrak Karmal served as the Afghan leader. During this period, the political membership bloomed from 6,000 to more than 40,000 members; these members were primarily from the urban-based elite. Nonetheless, he failed to gain popular support throughout the country. Furthermore, he continued to remain ideologically motivated to install a socialist government which was rejected by the average Afghan. Karmal would not relent, even when prodded by Gorbachev to abandon his socialist ideals in exchange for a more pragmatic approach to gain broader support. 32 Ultimately, Karmal was replaced by Najibullah who immediately initiated a reconciliation program aimed at building a more diverse, multiethnic support base. He did so using foreign aid to distribute rents, developing a patronage network including ethnic and tribal leaders, warlords, and militia groups. Most people, including the Afghan public, expected the Najibullah regime to fall almost immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it was not until 1991 when the Soviets withheld all funding, that the government fell. At this point, Najibullah no longer had access to the funding to maintain his patronage network and could not keep the loosely tied organization together. The Soviet advisory effort in all three areas, government, development, and security, was effective in isolated cases. However, as these advisors tried to force Soviet systems and tactics on Afghans they lost effectiveness. The average Afghan was unwilling to accept a socialist government no matter how well trained the government officials became, and the doctrine taught by the Soviet military advisors was ineffective in countering the insurgency in Afghanistan. As Soviet advisors became more directive, they took responsibility for solving Afghan problems and Afghans abdicated this obligation. The lesson here is that an advisory effort should assist
Afghan officials in implementing their own solutions rather than forcing a foreign system.
The final lesson to be gleaned is the fact that financial aid is the glue that holds the government together. As soon as foreign aid was lost, the government fell. Ideally the Soviet Union should not have been involved in funding the president's patronage networks.
Pragmatically, this was probably a small price to pay for stability in Afghanistan, particularly compared to large scale deployments. Additionally, one would be naive to think most representative governments in developed countries do not use some financial incentives to gain the support of influential constituents.
Ongoing conflict
The end of the Soviet Occupation was not the end of the war for Afghans, it simply marked another phase. Afghanistan has been embroiled in this struggle for over thirty years. The Soviet occupation gave way to the insurgency, overthrowing the Najibullah regime. Thereafter, the country was gripped by civil war with multiple warlords vying for power. Lawlessness opened an avenue for the Taliban to gain popular support, installing Sharia law throughout most of the country. Ultimately, their brutal methods were rejected, and many groups joined the Coalition to overthrow the Taliban. Interestingly enough, while Afghans did not accept the Soviet-style socialist government, the tribal-based society rejected Sharia law imposed by the Taliban as well. 34 Since that time, resistance to the Karzai-led government and Coalition occupation has fomented. Over the past 30 years, almost two million Afghans have been killed, and even more have been wounded. More than six million Afghans have fled to Pakistan and Iran, and at least two million more are internally displaced. 35 In total, well over a third of the population has become a casualty of this seemingly endless war, killed, wounded, or made homeless. While the damage to human capital is daunting, the physical destruction is equally troubling. During the Soviet occupation, at least half of the 24,000 villages were destroyed in an attempt to deny the Mujahadeen popular support. Millions of anti-personnel mines were scattered throughout the countryside. Orchards, irrigation canals, factories, roads, power facilities, and other infrastructure were destroyed. 36 This destruction continued after the departure of the Soviets, as warlords battled throughout the streets in cities like Kabul. In effect, the forty years of Soviet work was reversed.
The development efforts of the Soviets were not the only things lost in this conflict; social, political, and economic gains were devastated as well. Despite educational reforms, most of the political and social elites have either perished or traveled abroad looking for more promising opportunities. The political elites have been replaced by a new class, led by former Mujahadeen, and warlords. A culture of violence pervades Afghan society, fueled by access to weapons in almost every household. Finally, the loss of social elites, coupled with the destruction of infrastructure, has had a debilitating effect on the economy. This void has been filled by an opium based economy. 37 Consequently, despite the Soviet's best efforts, all their progress has been lost, replaced by a more dysfunctional society than when they invaded.
Similarities between the two conflicts
Numerous parallels exist between Afghanistan just prior to the Soviet withdrawal and the present condition. In both situations the government's capacity is limited, challenging development efforts. The Afghan government's reach in both cases, to include security, is limited to urban areas, allowing a growing resistance in smaller villages. In each case, the insurgents are supported by external sources emanating, primarily, from neighboring Pakistan.
The Afghan security forces in both conflicts are marginally capable, with significant difficulties in training, recruiting, and retention. The Soviets and the current Coalition have focused on an advisory effort. However, as success seems more unlikely, the potential exists for advisors to become more involved, ultimately taking responsibility for success or failure; this limits the Afghan's sense of responsibility, and leads to inadequate, foreign solutions to Afghan problems.
Finally, in both cases, the president was able to develop broad-based support through neopatrimonialism, a system of government where the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage networks. 38 These networks were maintained through foreign funding intended for other purposes. While this "corruption" appears to indicate rampant dysfunction throughout the government, in fact, it is the glue that holds the government together.
The Najibullah regime did not fall because of the insidious corruption, but rather because Soviets cut the funding which maintained his broad-based patronage networks. The fate of the current conflict is uncertain, but it is clear that cutting funding to the current government will likely end in its collapse.
Conclusion
Several lessons may be taken from these conflicts where history appears to be repeated.
First, this is fundamentally a political struggle, in a destitute environment, tormented by lethal activities. Sometimes it is difficult to keep focus on governmental development. This difficulty is borne by the fact that we desperately want to help the impoverished people, and are astonished by the endless violence. Nonetheless, the only enduring way to help the people is to assist in developing a government which is at least marginally capable of serving its people. Certainly, political gains must be supported by security and development; however without a stable government these efforts are fleeting. Second, as Soviets learned, simply supporting a central government has little effect on the people, particularly in rural Afghanistan. A significant component to increasing governmental capacity is reach. The linkage at the district level, connecting the Provincial governments to local Afghans, is critical. Admittedly, rural security and development will compliment this effort, but the governmental pillar is primary. The third lesson is that the diverse Afghan society does not have an affinity for foreign systems. There is a common expression, "Afghan good enough." This does not mean that it is good enough for
Afghans, but not good enough for others. It means that it is an Afghan solution; one that will work in Afghanistan, unlike western answers which are destined for failure. All too often, our advisory efforts attempt to develop Afghans in our image. Alternatively, we should assist in implementing Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. The fourth lesson is that Afghans must take responsibility for their development. Advisors invest themselves in mission success. We start out as advisors, then partners, and finally executers, with an audience of Afghans, willingly allowing us to do all the work. There is an old Afghan saying, "Shona khana mokonand". It means taking their shoulder out. Afghans are comfortable doing so. We need to take our shoulders out and force Afghans to take responsibility for solving their own problems. A fifth lesson is that cutting funding when the government is under-developed will likely result in collapse. There is another Afghan saying, "You can't buy an Afghan's loyalty, but you can lease it." Najibullah was able to elicit broad-based support by funding multi-ethnic patronage networks throughout Afghanistan. The same could be said about President Karzai, and the current ministers in Kabul. Finally, attaining self-sustaining stability in Afghanistan is a longterm effort. Education and training is the key to success, and this will take at least a generation.
This was evident while the Soviet Union focused on training and education. A critical element to this enduring effort is maintaining a stable Afghanistan in the interim to prevent another mass exodus of professionals.
Recommendations
These lessons indicate that a larger footprint is not needed in Afghanistan but rather a smaller, more focused effort by a single, civil-military command in a long-term effort to improve governmental capacity and reach, linking the central government to rural Afghanistan. A smaller civil-military command will ensure that our advisors continue to advise and not partner, leaving the responsibility of solving Afghan problems in the hands of Afghans. Advisors should assist in implementation of Afghan solutions rather than attempting to import foreign ones. The civil elements should include specialists capable of advising Afghans to increase governmental capacity in the central and provincial governments. The military advisory groups should be limited. They should focus on administrative, logistics, and training management systems at the brigade/provincial level and higher. We should minimize our advisory effort on operational missions and cease all partnering.
Village Stability Operations (VSO) is a special operations program conducted throughout
Afghanistan. It includes a local security solution, and development opportunities to rural Afghanistan. At the district level, VSO includes small district advisory teams which assist in linking the provincial government to the local community. 39 This program is a solution to rural security and governmental reach. It should be continued and expanded, if possible, by transitioning mature village stability operations to Afghan control, so current teams can shift to other areas, expanding the government's reach even more.
We should expand our efforts at primary and vocational education programs, and assist Afghans in improving their university system as well as offering more opportunities for advanced study abroad. Meanwhile, we should continue funding governmental, security, and developmental programs through the Afghan Government, acknowledging that some of the funding will be used to maintain patronage networks. This will maintain stability, while we work with the government to improve their systems and reduce corruption. Eventually, this will result in a functioning government with the capacity and reach to provide security and essential services to the populace. Ultimately, educated Afghans will remain in their country to assist in further governmental, economic, and developmental improvement.
It is unlikely that Afghanistan will ever be a flourishing society with a representative government, and self-sustaining free market economy. Nonetheless, if we focus our efforts appropriately, it can be a stable region again, limiting terrorist safe-havens in that part of the world.
